Password Manager
In plain English
Plain definition
It remembers passwords so people do not have to, so every account can have its own long random password and reuse stops being the easy option.
A password manager is software that generates, stores and fills in passwords from an encrypted vault opened with one master password. What matters to an organisation is who holds the vault’s key. In a well-designed product only the user can derive it, so the provider can neither read the vault nor reset a forgotten master password, and any recovery feature is a deliberate way around that which you must control. NIST SP 800-63B requires sign-in services to allow password managers and autofill, and the NCSC concludes their benefits outweigh their risks.
How it works under the hood
A local manager keeps the vault on one device: an attacker needs that device, but so does the user. A cloud-sync manager keeps it on a server so several devices can use it, which adds data in transit and remote account takeover to the risks. Browsers include their own managers; third-party ones sync across a mix of browsers and devices.
Ideally the decryption key is derived from the master password and nobody else, including a cloud provider, can reach it. Bitwarden, for example, runs the master password through PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA-256 (600,000 iterations by default) or Argon2id to produce a master key, and encrypts vault data with AES-256-CBC and HMAC-SHA-256 before it leaves the device. 1Password combines the account password with a 128-bit Secret Key. Autofill offers a credential only on the site it was saved for, which is why it helps against phishing.
Why admins care which one staff use
A vault holds every password its owner has, so it is a natural target. The NCSC’s buyers guide asks you to check that stored credentials use recommended encryption, that MFA protects every cloud-sync account and any vault holding administrator passwords, that export can be disabled or audited because exported passwords are unprotected, and that the vendor patches promptly. In enterprise products, administrators should not see individual passwords, and when one leaves, every password they could see should be changed.
Where it fits next to single sign-on and passkeys
It handles the passwords that remain. With effective single sign-on, staff may barely need one. The NCSC recommends passkeys as the first choice wherever offered, with a strong, unique password and two-step verification elsewhere. NIST tells services not to impose composition rules or periodic changes, and says they should permit paste so a manager works where autofill cannot.
Example of an Edge browser password policy
To stop staff saving passwords in Microsoft Edge, use “Enable saving passwords to the password manager” under Administrative Templates/Microsoft Edge/Password manager and protection, from MSEdge.admx, or in the registry:
Path: SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Edge
Name: PasswordManagerEnabled
Type: REG_DWORD
Value: 0x00000001 (Enabled: users can save passwords)
Disabled, users cannot save or add new passwords, but they can still use the ones they saved before. The policy stops new saves; it does not empty the browser’s store.
The myth that one vault is riskier than memorised passwords
An attack on a vault does expose everything in it, and NIST lists an insufficiently secure password manager as a threat. But the realistic alternative is reuse, which lets one leaked password open other accounts. The NCSC weighs both and still recommends managers, with MFA on the vault and prompt updates.
Related terms worth knowing
- Key derivation function: deliberately slow, salted hashing that turns a password into a key.
- Zero-knowledge encryption: the provider stores data it has no key to decrypt.
- Password stuffing: trying a password leaked from one site against the same person’s other accounts.
- Passkey: a credential protected by the device’s own unlock method.
Further reading from the NCSC and NIST
Read the NCSC’s Password manager buyers guide, NIST SP 800-63B and each product’s own security pages.
Checks before rolling out a company password manager
Decide first whether you want account recovery: without it a forgotten master password loses the vault, and with it the recovery route is something an attacker can try, so know who holds it. Require MFA on every vault before anyone stores administrator passwords. Turn off or audit export. Change the Edge policy last, once the new manager is in place; setting PasswordManagerEnabled back to enabled restores saving, and previously saved passwords were never removed.
Authoritative Sources
Technology documentation
Password manager buyers guide
NIST Special Publication 800-63B
PasswordManagerEnabled
Encryption Key Derivation
Encryption Protocols
About the 1Password security model
About this page
Credited to
Dates
Published
Corrections
No corrections are listed for this page. Some review sweeps corrected pages without naming each one; those are in the corrections log.
Was this useful?
Reports go to the site owner and are used to correct pages. Corrections are listed at /corrections.