Windows FastUnlock Lock-Screen Bypass Is Unpatched, and a TPM-Only BitLocker Setup Does Not Stop It
A researcher's FastUnlock technique lets someone holding a locked Windows PC run programs without signing in. Microsoft has issued no fix and no attacks are reported. Why TPM-only BitLocker does not help, and who should add a startup PIN.

A researcher has published a way for someone holding a locked Windows PC to run programs on it without signing in, and Microsoft has not yet issued a fix. The technique, named FastUnlock, was posted on Thursday 19 November by a researcher who uses the handles MSNightmare and Nightmare Eclipse. The endpoint security firm ThreatLocker tested it the same day and says it works. The Hacker News, reporting on Friday 20 November, adds two details that limit the risk: whoever uses it gets only a limited account, not administrator control, and nothing shows it has been used in a real attack. We are covering it now, rather than on the day, because the useful part for administrators is a decision about startup protection that most fleets have never had to make.
#What the technique does, and what it needs
According to ThreatLocker’s write-up, the bypass opens Narrator, Windows’ built-in screen reader, during the Microsoft account recovery flow on the lock screen and then navigates Windows settings from there. In its test the firm reached a point where it could run a program, using an external drive as the way to get code onto the machine, from a limited account it identified as “WSIAccount”, which it says is “not an administrator account”. It could not type on the physical keyboard while navigating with Narrator, and used the on-screen keyboard when it needed to type.
ThreatLocker lists the requirements: physical access to the machine, a Microsoft account available through the account recovery flow, and Narrator navigation using Caps Lock and the arrow keys. The Hacker News describes the conditions in the same way and says the technique does not work on every machine. Neither source publishes a list of affected Windows versions, and The Hacker News says no official list exists, so any machine that meets those conditions should be treated as possibly affected until Microsoft says otherwise. The researcher’s own disclosure, a GitHub post with a video and little written detail, is not something we could read; we are relying on ThreatLocker’s independent test and on The Hacker News’s account of it.
#Why BitLocker does not stop it in the common setup
Many administrators assume a locked, encrypted laptop is safe. FastUnlock shows why that depends on how BitLocker was set up. Microsoft’s BitLocker countermeasures page describes four ways to unlock an operating system drive on a device with a compatible Trusted Platform Module (TPM), the chip that holds the encryption keys. The first, TPM-only, “doesn’t require any interaction with the user to unlock and provide access to the drive”. Microsoft calls it more convenient for sign-in but less secure than the options that add a second factor. The others add a startup key on a USB drive, a PIN, or both.
The Hacker News explains the consequence. With TPM-only unlock, the drive is already unlocked by the time the lock screen appears, so the files are readable and the bypass runs at that point. FastUnlock does not break the encryption or recover the key. It works on a computer that has unlocked its own drive in the normal way, which, as The Hacker News puts it, is a smaller problem than cracking an encrypted disk but still a real one for a machine someone else is holding.
ThreatLocker’s own mitigation is specific. A BitLocker preboot PIN “will help mitigate this if the device was just turned on”, and it can protect a machine that is powered off or hibernated, because the PIN must be supplied before the drive unlocks and Windows starts. The Hacker News makes the limit plain: a startup PIN protects only a machine that has not yet started, not one already sitting on the lock screen.
#Who should worry
The risk is about who can touch the device, not about the network. We would not treat FastUnlock as a reason to change anything on a desktop in a locked office. We would treat it as relevant for four kinds of machine: laptops that travel, shared desks and hot-desking pools, front-counter and reception computers that a stranger can reach, and anything left unattended in a vehicle or a public space. The Hacker News’s own advice matches that list: lock away or closely manage machines a stranger could reach, add a startup PIN on sensitive machines, and shut down or hibernate devices when they leave someone’s control.
The limited account matters too. A program running as a low-privilege account is not the same as a full takeover, and we would not describe this as a way to read an encrypted disk. We think the realistic worry is a stolen or lost laptop that was left locked but running: a thief gets a foothold to run code, and from there the question is what else on the machine, or in the user’s cloud sign-ins, is reachable from a limited account. Our reading is that this is a physical-security finding with a software cause, and it should be handled like one.
#The trade-off behind a startup PIN
Microsoft’s documentation is candid about what a startup PIN costs. Preboot authentication prompts can be inconvenient to users; users who forget a PIN are locked out of their data until support provides a recovery key; and, for remote administration, preboot authentication “can also make it more difficult to update unattended or remotely administered devices because a PIN must be entered when a device reboots or resumes from hibernation”. For that last case Microsoft points to BitLocker Network Unlock, which lets devices that meet its hardware requirements and use TPM with PIN start without user intervention, provided they have a direct Ethernet connection to a Windows Deployment Services server.
That is a real cost for a help desk. Our view is that a blanket move to startup PINs, because of one unpatched lock-screen technique with no known attacks, is the wrong response for most fleets. We lean toward a tiered one: require a PIN on laptops that leave the building and on any device holding data you would have to report if it were lost, and accept TPM-only for fixed desktops behind a locked door. We would revisit that if exploitation is reported, or if Microsoft says the technique reaches further than the researchers have shown.
#What to do this week
- Find out how your devices unlock. On a Windows device, our read-only BitLocker volume status script lists each volume’s key protector types. A volume with only a TPM protector and a recovery password has no PIN. Run it through your management tool across the laptop fleet, not by hand.
- Decide which devices get a PIN. Microsoft names the group policy setting “Require additional authentication at startup” for this. Start with portable devices and plan the support cost: forgotten PINs, and updates on devices that must be restarted unattended.
- Tell people what to do with a laptop. Shut down or hibernate rather than lock when leaving a device somewhere you do not control. It is the one step that costs nothing: The Hacker News recommends it, and ThreatLocker’s point that a PIN protects a powered-off or hibernated machine points the same way.
- Watch for Microsoft’s response. There is no advisory yet. When one appears, check it for affected versions and whether the fix needs a policy change or an update.
- Do not rely on the lock screen alone. The Hacker News notes that Microsoft’s countermeasures guidance recommends a startup PIN, along with shutting down or hibernating machines, against determined hands-on attackers.
#If you run a small business
If your firm’s laptops are looked after by an IT provider, ask them one question in plain words: “If one of our laptops is stolen while it is locked, can someone use it without the password, and is it set to ask for a PIN before Windows starts?” If nobody manages your laptops, the simplest steps are the free ones: shut a laptop down, rather than just closing the lid, when you leave it in a car or a client’s office, and keep spare machines in a locked cupboard. Our small business section covers IT basics for firms with no IT team.
#What is not known
We do not know which Windows versions are affected, whether Microsoft will treat this as a security fix or a design limitation, or whether anyone is using it. The researcher’s own disclosure was not readable to us, and the only independent test we found is ThreatLocker’s, a vendor that sells security software. We will update this story if Microsoft responds, if the technique is reported in a real incident, or if further testing changes the list of conditions. For another recent change to how Windows devices are locked, see our earlier report on Intune remote lock for Windows.
Evidence trail
Sources and verification
Primary documentation and external technical references used in this article.
- 01The Hacker News: New Unpatched Windows 0-Day FastUnlock Lets Someone Holding a Locked PC Run Programs on Itthehackernews.com
- 02ThreatLocker: Proof of Concept for FastUnlock, Windows lock screen bypass from Nightmare Eclipsethreatlocker.com
- 03Microsoft Learn: BitLocker countermeasureslearn.microsoft.com
About this page
Credited to
Dates
Published
Corrections
No corrections are listed for this page. Some review sweeps corrected pages without naming each one; those are in the corrections log.
More news
All newsWas this useful?
Reports go to the site owner and are used to correct pages. Corrections are listed at /corrections.
Get new fixes by email.
New runbooks, configuration traps and fixes from KBY Technologies, about twice a week.




Comments
Add a thoughtful note on Windows FastUnlock Lock-Screen Bypass Is Unpatched, and a TPM-Only BitLocker Setup Does Not Stop It. Comments are checked for spam and held for moderation before appearing.