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Check a Mac App or pkg Is Developer ID Signed and Notarized Before You Deploy It

Is that Mac app or pkg signed and notarized? Run codesign, spctl, pkgutil and stapler on a test Mac, read each result, and find pkgs that stop installing in 2027.

KBY Technologies12 min readTier L115 min
Check a Mac App or pkg Is Developer ID Signed and Notarized Before You Deploy It

Before a third-party Mac app or installer package goes into your deployment catalogue, check it on a test Mac with four Apple tools. For an app, run codesign -vvv --deep --strict and then spctl -vvv --assess --type exec. For a package, run pkgutil --check-signature and then spctl --assess --type install. Finish either with xcrun stapler validate -v to see whether a notarization ticket is attached. All of them are read-only. The constraint that makes this urgent: Apple’s original Developer ID Certification Authority expires on 1 February 2027, and from that date any .pkg signed with a certificate it issued will no longer install. Notarized apps that carry a secure timestamp keep working, so packages are where the risk sits, and pkgutil --check-signature is the command that shows you which ones are affected.

#How a new installer is usually handled today

A vendor’s new version often arrives as a download link, someone installs it on their own Mac, it opens, and it goes into the catalogue. That proves the software runs on one machine that may already trust the vendor. It doesn’t prove the code is signed with the right certificate, that nothing inside the bundle changed after signing, or that Apple’s notary service has a ticket for it.

Those gaps matter because of what Gatekeeper does on every managed Mac. When software from outside the App Store is opened, Gatekeeper verifies that it comes from an identified developer, that Apple notarized it as free of known malicious content, and that it hasn’t been altered. Since macOS 10.15, software built after 1 June 2019 and distributed with Developer ID must be notarized. Software that fails those checks fails in front of users, and the person who approved it never saw the dialog.

The workaround people reach for under pressure is to tell users how to override Gatekeeper, or to turn it off. Apple documents that users can override Gatekeeper unless a device management service restricts it, and that it can be switched off completely. Either step removes the check that stops tampered or malicious software from running, for every app, to get one vendor’s package installed.

#What to do instead before a package reaches the fleet

Treat signing and notarization as an entry test that every new app and every new version must pass on a test Mac, before anyone packages, uploads or scopes it. The test answers four questions in order:

  1. Is the code signed, and is the signature intact all the way down, including nested frameworks and helpers?
  2. Is it signed with the right Developer ID certificate, with a secure timestamp from Apple’s timestamp server?
  3. Would Gatekeeper on this Mac, with its current policy, let it run or install?
  4. Is a notarization ticket stapled to it, so Gatekeeper can find the ticket even when the Mac is offline?

The order matters. codesign checks the signature’s integrity, but its manual is explicit that verification does not check the signature against OS policy: a valid signature can still fail Gatekeeper. spctl asks the policy question. Neither validates a stapled ticket, which is what stapler is for. Apps and packages also use different certificates. Apple says to sign apps, command line tools and disk images with a Developer ID Application certificate, and installer packages with a Developer ID Installer certificate.

Rendering diagram...

The diagram is the whole gate. Any failure sends the software back to the vendor; nothing on the failing branch involves changing a Mac’s security settings.

#Run the checks step by step

Use a test Mac on a current macOS release with Gatekeeper at its default setting, and copy the app or package into a folder you can write to. stapler needs the folder containing the file to be writable, and it needs internet access to reach Apple’s ticketing service. It ships with Xcode, so install Xcode on the test Mac and run it through xcrun. First confirm the assessment subsystem is enabled, so the spctl results reflect the policy your fleet runs:

1spctl --status

#
For an app bundle

  1. Verify the signature, including nested code. This is the command Apple gives for signing problems with anything other than an installer package:

    1codesign -vvv --deep --strict "/path/to/Example.app"

    --deep verifies nested code in full rather than the default shallow look, and --strict raises validation to the level notarization requires, for example rejecting symbolic links that point outside the bundle. Exit status 0 means every piece of code verified; 1 means verification failed. Stop at a failure.

  2. Check the signing details and the timestamp:

    1codesign -dvv "/path/to/Example.app"

    A signature with a secure timestamp shows a Timestamp line with a date. If you see Signed Time instead, the signature has no secure timestamp, which notarization requires.

  3. Ask Gatekeeper whether it would let the app run under this Mac’s current policy:

    1spctl -vvv --assess --type exec "/path/to/Example.app"

    Exit status 0 means the assessment passed. Exit status 3 means policy denied it with no other problem. Add --raw if you want the full result as a property list for your records.

Software developer analyzing code on a tablet in a modern office workspace.
Photo by Jakub Zerdzicki on Pexels

#
For an installer package

  1. Check the package signature and its certificate chain:

    1pkgutil --check-signature "/path/to/Example.pkg"

    For a properly signed package, Apple says the output includes Signed with a trusted timestamp and 1. Developer ID Installer: The command also prints the certificate chain, which you need for the Sub-CA check below.

  2. Ask Gatekeeper whether it would allow the installation:

    1spctl -vvv --assess --type install "/path/to/Example.pkg"

    The install type assesses installation of an installer package; without --type, spctl assesses execution, which is the wrong question for a .pkg.

#
For both: the stapled ticket

1xcrun stapler validate -v "/path/to/Example.pkg"

Exit status 0 means a ticket is attached and matches the latest one from Apple’s ticketing service. EX_NOINPUT covers a file that isn’t signed, isn’t a supported format, or has a missing or invalid ticket. EX_NOPERM means the ticket has been revoked. EX_NOHOST means the item was never notarized or the service gave an unexpected response. A missing staple is not always a failure: Apple publishes every ticket online too, so a Mac with a network connection can still find it. Record it, and prefer a stapled build from the vendor for Macs that install offline. stapler works on apps, signed flat packages and UDIF disk images only. Apple notes you can’t staple a ZIP archive, so check the items inside it.

#Find the packages that stop installing on 1 February 2027

Apple’s Developer News post is specific. The original Developer ID Certification Authority expires on 1 February 2027 and certificates it issued stop working that day. From then, .pkg files signed with an affected certificate will no longer install. Previously signed and notarized Mac software with a secure timestamp keeps working. That matches Apple’s Developer ID support page, which says an installer package only launches while its Developer ID Installer certificate is valid, whereas an app stays usable after its certificate expires if the certificate was valid when the app was signed.

Run pkgutil --check-signature over every package already in your catalogue, not only new ones, and read the chain each one prints. Replacement certificates come from the current authority, which Apple names Developer ID Certification Authority (G2). A package whose chain shows the original authority rather than G2 needs a re-signed build from its vendor before February. The KBY deadline page tracks this date: the original Developer ID Sub-CA expiry and what it breaks. In-house packages need re-signing with your own new G2 certificate.

#Limits on approving software that fails a check

Write down who can approve a package for the catalogue, and make a failed check something only that person can waive, in writing, with the vendor’s ticket number. Some rules keep the gate honest:

  • No one fixes a failure by changing the software. Re-signing or editing a vendor’s bundle breaks its notarization: Apple says a bundle modified after signing fails notarization with “The signature of the binary is invalid”.
  • No one fixes a failure by changing the Macs. Overriding or switching off Gatekeeper, fleet-wide or for one user, is out of scope for this workflow. The spctl manual says that from macOS 15.0, operations that modify its rule database or the global state of assessment are no longer supported, and points to configuration profiles instead, which puts any exception under change control where it belongs.
  • Revoked is final. Apple says a Developer ID app signed with a revoked certificate can no longer be installed and won’t launch if it’s already installed. A revoked ticket or certificate is a security event, not a packaging problem.
Laptop displaying code with reflection, perfect for tech and programming themes.
Photo by Christina Morillo on Pexels

#Confirm the results before you approve

Keep the output of each command with the catalogue entry: the version, the file name, the exit status of each check and the date. A package passes only when every row below holds.

What a passing app or package shows for each check
CheckPassing resultApplies to
codesign -vvv --deep --strictExit status 0App
codesign -dvvA Timestamp line with a date, not Signed TimeApp
pkgutil --check-signatureSigned with a trusted timestamp and 1. Developer ID Installer:, chain through the G2 authorityPackage
spctl --assess with the matching typeExit status 0Both
xcrun stapler validate -vExit status 0, or a recorded reason why an online ticket is acceptableBoth

Then do the real install on a clean test Mac the way your deployment tool will, and open the app. Apple warns that some older software can misbehave after notarization because Gatekeeper finds signing issues a relaxed notarization didn’t enforce, so the checks don’t replace a launch test. If an MDM later reports a package as installed but the app isn’t there, that is a different fault; diagnosing a pkg that MDM reports as installed while the app is missing covers it.

#What goes wrong with these checks

  • Running spctl --assess on a package without --type install. The default assesses execution, and the result doesn’t answer whether the package will install.
  • Reading a pass from codesign as a Gatekeeper pass. The manual says verification doesn’t check OS policy.
  • Running stapler validate from a read-only disk image or folder, or with no network, and recording the error as a missing ticket. Copy the file to a writable folder first and make sure the test Mac is online.
  • Checking new versions only. The February 2027 problem sits in packages you approved years ago and still deploy.

#Roll back a package that slipped through

These checks change nothing on the test Mac, so there is nothing on it to undo. The state change in this workflow is promoting a version into the deployment catalogue. Before you promote one, make sure the previous approved version and its check results are still stored and deployable, so you have something to go back to. If a promoted package fails on users’ Macs:

  1. Stop new deployments of that version in your deployment tool, leaving machines that installed it alone until you know why it failed.
  2. Scope the previous approved version again for Macs that need the app now.
  3. Rerun the four checks on the failing file to find which one it fails, and send the output to the vendor.
  4. Promote a fixed build only after it passes every check and a launch test.

The rollback is complete when the previous version installs and opens on a test Mac and new installs of the bad version have stopped.

#What to track each month

Three numbers show whether the gate is doing its job: the share of catalogue entries with stored check output for their current version, the number of packages whose chain still shows the original Developer ID authority (this should reach zero before 1 February 2027), and the number of new versions sent back to a vendor and why. A rising count of Gatekeeper-related tickets after a rollout means something got past the gate, and its check record is the first thing to read. Teams that build packages with AutoPkg can run the same commands as a pipeline step; replacing manual repackaging with AutoPkg shows where such a step fits.

#Before you go live with a new app version

  • spctl --status shows assessment enabled on the test Mac.
  • App: codesign -vvv --deep --strict exits 0 and codesign -dvv shows a Timestamp.
  • Package: pkgutil --check-signature shows a trusted timestamp, a Developer ID Installer certificate and a G2 chain.
  • spctl --assess with the right --type exits 0.
  • xcrun stapler validate -v exits 0, or the reason it doesn’t is recorded.
  • The previous approved version is still stored and deployable.
  • A real install and launch on a clean test Mac worked.

If any line fails, the next step is the vendor, with the command output attached, not a change to the Macs.

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