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Unconstrained Kerberos Delegation Found on a Member Server: Contain It and Move to Constrained Delegation

High severity Target recovery 30mActive Directory

Overview

A member server or service account trusted for unconstrained Kerberos delegation can impersonate any user who authenticates to it, including Domain Admins, to any service. Mark privileged accounts as not delegated, configure classic KCD or resource-based constrained delegation for the back ends the application needs, then clear TrustedForDelegation, recording each value and previewing with -WhatIf.

Markdown, one checkbox per step, for pasting into a ticket.

Diagnose

Symptom

What responders observe.

Open this runbook when any of these is true: The Defender for Identity "Unsecure Kerberos delegation" assessment lists a computer or user account that is not a domain controller.

A directory review returns a non-domain controller account with TrustedForDelegation : True, which is the TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION flag (0x80000, 524288) in userAccountControl.

A change record shows unconstrained delegation was enabled on a server or service account to make a double-hop application work.

Users see nothing.

The application usually works, which is why the setting survives.

The risk is silent.

Microsoft's example is an IIS application pool with unconstrained delegation: a Domain Admin who browses to the site gives that site the ability to request tickets to any service as that admin, including a domain controller.

Detection

Metrics, logs and confirmation commands.

  1. Answer three questions before you change anything: Why was delegation set? Ask the application owner which back-end services the server calls in the user's context, for example SQL Server or a web API, and get their service principal names (SPNs). ServicePrincipalNames on each back-end account shows the SPNs it registers. If nobody can name the back-end services, do not guess: escalate (see Escalation) and contain privileged accounts only. Where do the front end and back end live? Classic KCD is configured on the front-end account, needs domain admin rights and is limited to one domain. RBCD is configured on the back-end account by its administrator and works across domains. Does the service need protocol transition? TrustedToAuthForDelegation : True means the account is trusted to authenticate for delegation, the bit that controls protocol transition in classic KCD. Microsoft calls this a security-sensitive setting. RBCD cannot use that bit, because the KDC always allows protocol transition for RBCD. Back ends can tell the two cases apart by the SIDs S-1-18-1 (authentication authority asserted identity) and S-1-18-2 (service asserted identity). The decision path for this incident: flowchart TD A[Unconstrained delegation found on an account] --> B{Account is a domain controller?} B -- Yes --> Z[Expected setting: outside this runbook] B -- No --> C[Record delegation settings and SPNs] C --> S{Signs of compromise?} S -- Yes --> T[Escalate to security incident response] S -- No --> D[Set AccountNotDelegated on privileged accounts] D --> E{Back-end services and SPNs known?} E -- No --> F[Escalate to the application owner] E -- Yes --> G[Configure classic KCD or RBCD] G --> H[Clear TrustedForDelegation after a WhatIf preview] H --> I{Application works for a standard test user?} I -- No --> J[Restore TrustedForDelegation and escalate] I -- Yes --> K[Validate and close the incident]

Root cause

Why the incident occurred.

  1. Answer three questions before you change anything: Why was delegation set?

  2. Ask the application owner which back-end services the server calls in the user's context, for example SQL Server or a web API, and get their service principal names (SPNs).

  3. ServicePrincipalNames on each back-end account shows the SPNs it registers.

  4. If nobody can name the back-end services, do not guess: escalate (see Escalation) and contain privileged accounts only.

  5. Where do the front end and back end live?

  6. Classic KCD is configured on the front-end account, needs domain admin rights and is limited to one domain.

  7. RBCD is configured on the back-end account by its administrator and works across domains.

  8. Does the service need protocol transition?

  9. TrustedToAuthForDelegation : True means the account is trusted to authenticate for delegation, the bit that controls protocol transition in classic KCD.

  10. Microsoft calls this a security-sensitive setting.

  11. RBCD cannot use that bit, because the KDC always allows protocol transition for RBCD.

  12. Back ends can tell the two cases apart by the SIDs S-1-18-1 (authentication authority asserted identity) and S-1-18-2 (service asserted identity).

  13. The decision path for this incident: flowchart TD A[Unconstrained delegation found on an account] --> B{Account is a domain controller?} B -- Yes --> Z[Expected setting: outside this runbook] B -- No --> C[Record delegation settings and SPNs] C --> S{Signs of compromise?} S -- Yes --> T[Escalate to security incident response] S -- No --> D[Set AccountNotDelegated on privileged accounts] D --> E{Back-end services and SPNs known?} E -- No --> F[Escalate to the application owner] E -- Yes --> G[Configure classic KCD or RBCD] G --> H[Clear TrustedForDelegation after a WhatIf preview] H --> I{Application works for a standard test user?} I -- No --> J[Restore TrustedForDelegation and escalate] I -- Yes --> K[Validate and close the incident].

Contain and prevent

Blast radius

What else this can affect.

Prevention

Controls and guardrails that stop it recurring.

  • Make "Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated" the default for every new privileged account, and review the Defender for Identity delegation recommendations every week.

  • Run the Stabilisation query on a schedule and alert on any non-domain controller result.

  • Require a named back-end SPN list in every change that requests delegation.

  • Prefer RBCD, which puts the decision with the owner of the resource.

  • Close the related directory hardening gaps the same review finds, such as LDAP signing not being required on domain controllers.

Fix

Pre-flight checks

Check these before you change anything.

  1. The Active Directory module for Windows PowerShell on a management workstation.

  2. Domain Admins, or delegated rights on the affected objects, for the state-changing steps.

  3. The application owner, able to name the back-end services and test the application.

Commands

Get-ADComputer -Filter 'TrustedForDelegation -eq $true' -Properties TrustedForDelegation,TrustedToAuthForDelegation,ServicePrincipalNames
Get-ADDomainController -Filter *
Get-ADUser -Filter 'TrustedForDelegation -eq $true' -Properties TrustedForDelegation,userAccountControl
Get-ADComputer -Identity <server> -Properties TrustedForDelegation,TrustedToAuthForDelegation,userAccountControl,msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo,ServicePrincipalNames
Get-ADUser -Identity <admin> -Properties AccountNotDelegated,userAccountControl
Set-ADAccountControl -Identity <admin> -AccountNotDelegated $true
Get-ADComputer -Identity <backend> -Properties PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount
Set-ADComputer -Identity <backend> -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount $FrontEnd
Get-ADComputer -Identity <server> | Set-ADAccountControl -TrustedForDelegation $false

Verify and recover

Verification

Evidence required before you close the incident.

  1. Rerun Get-ADComputer -Filter 'TrustedForDelegation -eq $true'. — Only domain controllers are listed. — The server is no longer trusted for unconstrained delegation.

  2. Get-ADUser -Identity <admin> -Properties AccountNotDelegated for each protected account. — AccountNotDelegated : True. — Every privileged account is protected.

  3. A standard test user runs the application path that reaches the back end. — The request succeeds. — Constrained delegation serves the application.

Commands in these steps

  • Get-ADUser -Identity <admin> -Properties AccountNotDelegated for each protected account. — AccountNotDelegated : True. — Every privileged account is protected

Rollback

The safe way back.

  1. Set-ADAccountControl -Identity <admin> -AccountNotDelegated $false for a privileged account whose delegation is proven to be required.

  2. Restore the recorded RBCD principals with Set-ADComputer -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount, or Set-ADComputer -Identity <backend> -Clear msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity if it was empty.

  3. Remove the SPNs added for classic KCD in the front end delegation settings.

  4. Get-ADComputer -Identity <server> | Set-ADAccountControl -TrustedForDelegation $true, then reopen the incident.

Commands in this rollback

  • Set-ADAccountControl -Identity <admin> -AccountNotDelegated $false for a privileged account whose delegation is proven to be required
  • Get-ADComputer -Identity <server> | Set-ADAccountControl -TrustedForDelegation $true, then reopen the incident

Escalate when

Conditions that need another owner.

  • Escalate to security incident response straight away if privileged accounts signed in to the server while it was trusted for unconstrained delegation and compromise is suspected.

  • Microsoft's guidance warns that such a service can act as those users against any service, including domain controllers.

  • Treat it as SEV-1 and do not change the server further without their agreement.

  • Escalate to the application owner and the directory architect when nobody can name the back-end SPNs, or when the front end and back end are in different domains or forests and classic KCD cannot work.

  • Escalate to the security owner before you set TrustedToAuthForDelegation on any account.

  • Application owner Security incident response.

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Sources

Based on the vendor sources listed below. Check each step against your environment before acting.

First published 18 November 2026

Publisher: Microsoft Learnlearn.microsoft.com

Accounts security posture assessments (Microsoft Defender for Identity)

Cited for: Supports the documented platform behaviour, diagnosis or recovery controls used by this Runbook.

Publisher: Microsoft Learnlearn.microsoft.com

Kerberos Constrained Delegation Overview

Cited for: Supports the documented platform behaviour, diagnosis or recovery controls used by this Runbook.

Publisher: Microsoft Learnlearn.microsoft.com

Use the UserAccountControl flags to manipulate user account properties

Cited for: Supports the documented platform behaviour, diagnosis or recovery controls used by this Runbook.

Publisher: Microsoft Learnlearn.microsoft.com

Set-ADAccountControl

Cited for: Supports the documented platform behaviour, diagnosis or recovery controls used by this Runbook.

Publisher: Microsoft Learnlearn.microsoft.com

Get-ADComputer

Cited for: Supports the documented platform behaviour, diagnosis or recovery controls used by this Runbook.

Publisher: Microsoft Learnlearn.microsoft.com

Set-ADComputer

Cited for: Supports the documented platform behaviour, diagnosis or recovery controls used by this Runbook.

Publisher: Microsoft Learnlearn.microsoft.com

Get-ADUser

Cited for: Supports the documented platform behaviour, diagnosis or recovery controls used by this Runbook.

Publisher: Microsoft Learnlearn.microsoft.com

Get-ADDomainController

Cited for: Supports the documented platform behaviour, diagnosis or recovery controls used by this Runbook.

Publisher: Microsoft Learnlearn.microsoft.com

Protected Users security group

Cited for: Supports the documented platform behaviour, diagnosis or recovery controls used by this Runbook.

Publisher: Microsoft Learnlearn.microsoft.com

ms-DS-Allowed-To-Delegate-To attribute

Cited for: Supports the documented platform behaviour, diagnosis or recovery controls used by this Runbook.

Publisher: Microsoft Learnlearn.microsoft.com

Configure Kerberos constrained delegation (KCD) in Microsoft Entra Domain Services

Cited for: Supports the documented platform behaviour, diagnosis or recovery controls used by this Runbook.

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Unconstrained Kerberos Delegation Found on a Member Server