Confluence Data Center’s Old SOAP API Is Being Exploited, and One Intrusion Reached Microsoft 365 in Twelve Hours
Rapid7 traced an attack from Confluence's SOAP interface to a Microsoft 365 sign-in in about twelve hours, and CISA lists CVE-2026-90436 as exploited. The one setting to check, the fixed version, and what to look for in your logs.

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Rapid7 says one of its managed detection customers was breached on Friday 13 November through a Confluence Data Center server, and that about twelve hours after the first malicious request the attacker was signed in to the company’s Microsoft 365The KBY LexiconMicrosoft 365Microsoft 365 is Microsoft's subscription suite of Office apps and cloud services such as Exchange Online, SharePoint, OneDrive and Teams, run on an Entra ID tenant. tenant. The way in was the SOAP interface Confluence still carries for old scripts and integrations, which runs on Apache Axis 1.x, a library that has reached end of life. The flaw is CVE-2026-90436. CISA added it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue on Wednesday 18 November, with a due date of Saturday 21 November for US federal agencies, and Rapid7 reports that a Metasploit exploit module has been public since Tuesday 17 November.
A Confluence Data Center server is exposed only if one setting is switched on, and Atlassian says it is off by default for new installations. If it is on, the decision is today’s: upgrade, or clear one checkbox.
#How an old library turns a malformed reply into code execution
The CVE record, as reproduced in the Debian security tracker, describes a flaw in how Axis 1.x handles an inbound SOAP fault. When the fault carries a detail element with an exception name, Axis loads the class with that name and, if a text value is also supplied, creates an instance of it through its string constructor, all before it checks that the class is a genuine Axis fault. Loading a class is enough to run its static initialiser. With a suitable class on the application’s classpath, that leads to remote code execution.
The record adds the detail that matters most to defenders: the fault is parsed while the engine works out which service is being called, before any per-service handler chain runs, so authentication handlers configured on a service do not protect against it. That is why Rapid7 describes the requests as unauthenticated. It affects every Axis 1.x release through 1.4, and the record says the Apache Axis project does not expect to publish a fixed 1.x release. Its advice is to move to a different SOAP engine such as Axis 2, or to build Axis with a patch that Apache has published as a commit.
Our reading is that this bug is dangerous because of where Axis 1.x ends up, not because of Axis itself. It is a library bundled inside other products, usually for an interface their owners stopped thinking about years ago. The people who needed to know about it were the vendors who embed it, and a vendor that embeds it has to ship its own fix.
#What Atlassian says is affected
Atlassian’s advisory covers Confluence Data Center and rates the flaw critical, 9.3 on CVSS 4.0, by its own assessment. It lists versions 1.x to 9.x as affected, but only when the “Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP)” setting is enabled. Atlassian says that setting has been off by default for new installations since Confluence 3.0, that the feature was removed completely in Confluence 10.0, and that Atlassian Cloud sites, the ones on an atlassian.net address, are not vulnerable.
The only fixed version the advisory names is 9.2.28. For installations on earlier release lines the advisory names no fixed release, which in our reading means the practical choices are to move to 9.2.28 or a 10.x release, or to switch the setting off and plan the upgrade. We suspect, though no source says so, that long-lived installations are the ones most likely to still have it on, because an old integration may have needed it once and nobody cleared it afterwards.
#The twelve hours Rapid7 describes
Rapid7’s managed detection team responded on 13 November to a burst of alerts about unusual child processes launched by a Confluence server. The access logs showed unauthenticated POST requests to /plugins/servlet/soap-axis1/confluenceservice-v2, each answered with an HTTPThe KBY LexiconHTTPHTTP is a stateless application-level protocol for request and response messages. Safe validation requires a bounded target and both protocol and application evidence.
500 error. The errors were misleading: Rapid7 says endpoint telemetry showed Confluence’s Java process starting BashThe KBY LexiconBashBash is the POSIX-compatible shell and scripting language used to run commands, automate tasks and control Unix-like systems.
and curl, as the dedicated Confluence service account, within seconds of the requests.
The attacker then ran hundreds of hex-encoded commands and scripts fetched from temporary Pinggy and Cloudflare Tunnel addresses. Rapid7 says the commands wrapped their output in labelled delimiters and carried sequential task numbers, a structure it says suggests AI-assisted automated tooling. That is Rapid7’s inference, and it does not change what to do.
The sequence, as Rapid7 reports it, shows how much a Confluence server holds:
- About three minutes after the first command, the attacker was signing in to the MySQL database with Confluence’s own stored database credentials, and querying page bodies, application links and attachments whose names suggested credentials, tokens, VPN configurations and private keys.
- Scripts then went through the files in Confluence’s default attachment folder, parsed Office documents, searched for credentials and looked for payment card numbers, using a Luhn check to discard false matches.
- A credential found in the application was used to query the Atlassian Crowd directory service for users and group memberships. An AS-REP roasting attempt against a domain controller failed.
- Roughly four hours after the first exploit request, the attacker obtained a service account credential and began querying a production cloud data warehouse.
- Roughly twelve hours after it, the attacker signed in to Microsoft 365 as an integration service account, using legacy authentication, from an address that also appeared in the hostname of the tunnel used earlier.
Rapid7 does not name the customer, and neither do we. It also does not say what data, if any, left the environment. The report describes searching and signing in, which is not the same as confirmed theft, and we are not reading more into it than that.
#Who has said what, and when
| Date (2026) | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Early November | Atlassian publishes its Confluence Data Center advisory; its page was last modified on 10 November | Atlassian |
| Thursday 12 November | A proof-of-concept exploit aimed at N-central is published | Rapid7 |
| Friday 13 November | Rapid7 detects exploitation against Confluence; N-able reports exploitation against N-central, for a flaw Rapid7 says strongly correlates to this one | Rapid7 |
| Monday 16 November | N-able releases N-central 2026.4 HF3 and permanently blocks legacy APIs | N-able |
| Tuesday 17 November | A Metasploit module for the Confluence flaw is released | Rapid7 |
| Wednesday 18 November | CISA adds CVE-2026-90436 to its catalogue | CISA |
Two caveats on the evidence. The Confluence intrusion is described by Rapid7 alone; we found no second report of it. And CISA’s entry names Apache Axis, not Confluence or N-central, and lists known ransomware use as unknown. What the catalogue does say is that the product could be end of life and that users should stop using it or move to a supported one. Its entry also carries a forensic triage flag of Yes and points agencies to CISA’s forensics triage requirements.
#What to check on a Confluence server today
- Confirm which edition you run. Atlassian Cloud is not affected, Confluence 10.x is not affected, and anything from 1.x to 9.x on Data Center needs the next steps.
- In Confluence, open General Configuration, then Further Configuration, and look at “Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP)”. If it is ticked, you are exposed.
- If you cannot upgrade today, edit the settings, clear the box and save. Atlassian says no restart is needed. Expect anything that uses the API, such as scripts, automations and some third-party add-ons, to stop working, which is a good reason to find out now what depends on it.
- Confirm the change worked. Atlassian says that after mitigation, browsing to
/plugins/servlet/soap-axis1/confluenceservice-v2on your base address should return HTTP 403 Forbidden. Anything mentioning the Axis service means the setting did not take. - Upgrade to 9.2.28 or a 10.x release when you can.
- Look back, not just forward. The advisory pre-dates the attack Rapid7 saw by days, so search your web access logs from the first week of November for POST requests to that path, and look for the Confluence Java process starting Bash, curl or similar. A 500 response is not evidence that the request failed. Atlassian says it cannot confirm whether any instance was affected and tells you to involve your security team. Rapid7 publishes the indicators it saw, and says the absence of them does not prove you were clean.
- If you find anything, treat every credential stored in or reachable from Confluence as exposed: database logins, application links, service accounts and anything pasted into a page.
Confluence is not the only place Axis 1.x may be hiding. Any Java application you run could carry it. A reasonable first pass is to search your servers for files named axis*.jar, then ask each vendor whether the product uses Axis 1.x and has been fixed. That is our suggestion, not a vendor procedure, and a file’s presence does not mean the product is vulnerable.
#Why the Microsoft 365 sign-in is the part to remember
The intrusion Rapid7 describes did not need a second vulnerability. Once the attacker had a shell as the Confluence account, the application’s own configuration supplied the database login, and its pages and attachments supplied further credentials. Confluence is where teams put runbooks, so it is also where secrets end up. The final step, a sign-in to Microsoft 365 with legacy authentication, is one that a tenant can close in advance. If you have not already blocked legacy authentication with a Conditional Access policy, and you do not need it, this is a reminder to look at what still uses it. Service accounts used for integrations are the usual reason it stays on.
It is also worth noticing how differently the flaw has been rated. The Debian tracker lists its axis package as unfixed in bookworm, trixie and unstable, and records the issue as ignored for bookworm and trixie, with a note that it is a minor issue. That is a reasonable call for a distribution that ships the library without a SOAP server behind it. It is the wrong call for a product that exposes the library to the internet, and the gap between those two situations is why a flaw can look minor in one list and be on CISA’s catalogue in another.
#If a provider runs your systems
N-central is a management tool used by managed service providers, so firms with no IT team of their own can be affected without running any of this. Our earlier story on the N-central attacks has the detail. N-able’s release notes say HF3, build 2026.4.1.39, permanently blocks legacy APIs, and Rapid7 says on-premises administrators should still confirm the Legacy API setting is off and upgrade on an emergency basis.
For a business owner or office manager, two questions are enough. Ask your provider whether any server they manage for you runs Confluence Data Center or N-central, and, if so, whether it has been updated or had the setting disabled since 13 November. Confluence Cloud users need do nothing about this flaw. Our small business section has plain-language guides on questions to put to a provider.
#What we expect next
We expect more products to be named. Other software embeds Axis 1.x, Apache does not expect to ship a fixed 1.x release, and a public exploit module lowers the effort needed to try the same request against anything that exposes a SOAP endpoint. We would be proved wrong if vendors’ advisories over the next fortnight turn out to list only Confluence and N-central. We also expect pressure on Atlassian to name fixed versions for more release lines, since the advisory lists only one.
Our advice is plain. If you run Confluence Data Center and the box is ticked, clear it now and read your logs before you read anything else, because the exploit is public and attackers have already used it.
Evidence trail
Sources and verification
Primary documentation and external technical references used in this article.
- 01Rapid7: exploitation of CVE-2026-90436 against Atlassian Confluence Data Centerrapid7.com
- 02Atlassian: CVE-2026-90436, Remote Code Execution in Confluence Data Centerconfluence.atlassian.com
- 03Debian Security Tracker: CVE-2026-90436 (CVE record text)security-tracker.debian.org
- 04N-able: N-central 2026.4 HF3 release notesstatus.n-able.com
- 05CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities cataloguecisa.gov
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