Optimizely Flaw Let Attackers Plant Card Skimmer and iPhone Exploits on 178 Organisations’ Websites
Malicious code served through Optimizely hit the BBC, CNN, Zoom, HSBC Insurance and other sites, 178 organisations in all, on 16 November. How it got there, what it did, and what Optimizely customers and visitors should check.

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Malicious JavaScript was served to visitors of at least 178 organisations’ websites on Monday 16 November, including the BBC, CNN, Fox News, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab and HSBC Insurance, because an attacker planted it in their Optimizely Web Experimentation projects. Optimizely says an unauthorised party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation product, that it has fixed the flaw and removed the injected code, and that it is still monitoring. The code swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses, skimmed payment card details, stole cookies and screenshots, and tried to load iOS exploit kits on iPhones.
The attack was found and mapped by Scott Helme, the security researcher behind Report URI, who published a detailed timeline on Monday. BleepingComputer reported it the same evening and carried Optimizely’s statement. If you run Optimizely on your own website, or if you visited one of the affected sites on Monday, there are specific things to check, and they are set out below.
#A testing tool with the keys to the page
Optimizely Web Experimentation is an A/B testing product. A site adds one script tag pointing at Optimizely’s content delivery network, and from then on marketing and product teams can change what visitors see (a headline, a button colour, a checkout layout) from Optimizely’s own dashboard, without a release of the website. To make that work, the snippet runs inside the page with the same rights as the site’s own code. It can read the page, change it, and send data anywhere the page is allowed to send it.
One feature of that dashboard is a “Project JavaScript” field: code the customer writes once and Optimizely includes in every page that loads the project’s snippet. According to Helme, that is where the attacker put the malicious loader. Optimizely’s CDN then delivered it to every visitor, from the legitimate cdn.optimizely.com address that the sites had deliberately trusted. Helme is explicit that the CDN itself was not poisoned: in his words, “Optimizely’s CDN served exactly what it was given”.
How the attacker got write access to so many customers’ projects was not known when Helme published. Optimizely’s statement to BleepingComputer filled part of the gap: it said the attacker exploited a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow and “used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects”. Its status page describes a “Web Experimentation Security Incident”, says it has fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code from affected projects and taken steps to secure affected user accounts. It does not say how many customers were affected or how long the code was live. Optimizely’s own www.optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com snippets carried the code too, according to Helme.
#What the code did to visitors
Helme found 188 infected Optimizely snippets, belonging to 178 organisations, among 1,611 snippets he fetched, and he expects the real number to be higher. Besides the names above, BleepingComputer lists KLM, Air France, Smartsheet, Stamps.com, Mutual of Omaha, American Eagle, Change.org, Bitly, IG and UNICEF USA among the sites he identified. Helme also names TalkTalk as the last organisation whose snippet was still infected at 21:52 UK time on Monday.
The injected loader fetched a second script from a domain registered that morning, 1688360[.]cc, in some copies hidden behind base64 encoding. Helme’s analysis of that payload describes four jobs:
- replacing cryptocurrency wallet addresses copied or typed into the page with addresses the attacker controls;
- skimming payment card details from forms and sending them to the attacker’s server, a feature added at 13:43 UK time;
- stealing cookies that scripts can read, and screenshots of the page;
- loading two iOS exploit kits, which Helme identifies as Coruna, aimed at iOS 13 to 17, and DarkSword, aimed at iOS 18.
The wallets embedded in the code had received about $7,000 by Monday evening, Helme told BleepingComputer, though some of those wallets predate the attack, so the amount actually stolen through it is unclear. The card skimming and the iOS exploits are potentially more serious than the crypto theft and much harder to count.
#Monday, hour by hour
Helme’s timeline, in UK time (the same as UTC in November), is the clearest account of the window in which visitors were exposed:
- 04:21: the first injected Optimizely snippet he saw (a clean copy of the BBC’s snippet was captured at 02:21);
- 05:23: the attacker’s domain was registered, after its certificates were issued from 04:28;
- 08:10: the first build of the second-stage script;
- 13:03: funds swept from the attacker’s wallets to exchanges;
- 13:43: the card skimmer added;
- 19:24 to 19:59: Helme’s sweep found 186 of 1,611 snippets infected;
- about 20:40 to 21:10: mass clean-up;
- 21:52: one snippet still infected.
Helme also links an earlier wave from 13 to 16 November that used a different domain and reached sites through three other third-party script providers, Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media. That suggests a campaign that goes after whichever script supplier it can get into, not one aimed only at Optimizely.
#Why a content security policy mostly did not help
The standard defence against a third-party script going bad is a content security policy (CSP), a header that tells the browser which addresses a page may load code from and send data to. It is worth being clear about its limits here. The malicious loader came from cdn.optimizely.com, which every affected site allows, so a CSP could not stop the first stage. Where it could help was the second stage: a policy that restricts where scripts may be loaded from and where data may be sent (connect-src) would have stopped the browser fetching the payload from 1688360[.]cc or posting stolen data back to it.
Helme’s crawl found that only a small minority of the affected organisations had a policy strict enough to block the payload, and many had none at all. In our view that is the real lesson of this incident. Third-party scripts with write access to the page are routine on large commercial sites, and the supplier’s security becomes yours the moment you add the tag. A strict connect-src list is the cheapest control that still works when a trusted supplier is compromised.
#Our view on Optimizely’s handling
Optimizely fixed the flaw and cleaned customer projects within a day, which is quick. What it has not yet done publicly is say how many customer projects were changed, when the vulnerable path was first abused, and whether any data in customers’ Optimizely accounts was read. Helme says he tried several channels to reach the company before publishing and had no response. For a supplier whose code runs inside its customers’ checkout pages, we think a short incident report with those three facts is the minimum customers should expect, and they should ask for it.
Salesforce has already acted on its own: it told BleepingComputer that, as a precaution, Optimizely scripts are disabled across its preview and production instances while it investigates, and that it will notify customers if it finds unauthorised access to their data.
We expect more affected organisations to confirm exposure this week, and some to notify customers whose card details were entered on Monday, particularly in the UK and EU where a card skimming incident on a checkout page is likely to be reportable personal data breach territory. If Optimizely reports that the signup flaw was abused earlier than 16 November, the exposure window, and this story, gets bigger.
#If your site runs Optimizely
- Open every Web Experimentation project and read its Project JavaScript and any shared code. Look for references to 1688360[.]cc and for unexpected base64 strings passed to atob(), which Helme lists as the marks of the injected loader.
- Review who has access to your Optimizely account, remove anyone you do not recognise, and rotate passwords and API tokens, as Helme advises.
- Treat card details entered on your pages on Monday 16 November as possibly exposed and involve your payment provider and data protection lead. UK organisations should decide early, with that lead, whether it has to be reported to the ICO.
- Rotate any secret held in a cookie that scripts can read (one without the HttpOnly flag).
- Add or tighten a content security policy, starting with connect-src, so a compromised supplier cannot send data to an address you have never heard of.
- Ask Optimizely, in writing: “Was our account or any of our projects modified by the attacker, and between what times?”
#If you visited an affected site on Monday
Check any cryptocurrency transfer you made on 16 November and confirm the receiving address was the one you intended. Watch card statements for payments you do not recognise and tell your bank about any you find. Update iPhones and iPads: Helme recommends iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later. If you do not use an affected site, use cryptocurrency or own an iPhone on an older iOS version, there is nothing more to do.
Evidence trail
Sources and verification
Primary documentation and external technical references used in this article.
- 01Optimizely status page: Web Experimentation Security Incidentstatus.optimizely.com
- 02Report URI (Scott Helme): World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizelyblog.report-uri.com
- 03BleepingComputer: Optimizely hack infected CNN, Fox News, BBC, Salesforce sites with malwarebleepingcomputer.com
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