msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes: RC4 Still Wins Kerberos
Overview
A service account whose msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes still includes RC4 can be issued RC4 service tickets that any domain user can request for its SPN and crack offline. Phasing RC4 out safely needs an audit, a pilot, dependency checks and a rollback plan.
At a glance
- Symptom
- Any domain user requests a TGS for the SPN, and the KDC issues an RC4-encrypted ticket crackable offline.
- Likely cause
- Service account SPNs left with msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes unset or including the RC4-HMAC bit.
- Impact
- Offline brute-forcing of a service account password with no failed logon events, leading to lateral movement or privilege escalation.
- Verification signal
- Re-run the detection test and a controlled negative-path test.
- Safe correction
- Restrict msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes to AES128/AES256, enforce via GPO, rotate exposed passwords, and migrate to gMSA where possible.
- Rollback or recovery
- Restore the exported configuration if the new control blocks required production traffic, then narrow the policy before redeployment.
The Trap
RC4-HMAC fallback in Kerberos service ticket encryption, driven by an unset or misconfigured msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes attribute on accounts holding a Service Principal Name (SPN).
The Default State
msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes is a bitmask: 0x1 (DES-CBC-CRC), 0x2 (DES-CBC-MD5), 0x4 (RC4-HMAC), 0x8 (AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96), 0x10 (AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96). Accounts created before AES support was introduced, or whose encryption types were never explicitly configured, have this attribute unset entirely. When it is unset, the KDC applies the DCs’ default for such accounts (DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes), which long included RC4. Windows updates released from April 2026 (CVE-2026-20833) change that default to AES only (0x18) and enforce it, with a temporary rollback that the July 2026 updates remove, but a DC with an explicit DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes value that allows RC4, or one without those updates, still issues RC4 tickets, so check what your DCs allow. On such DCs, clients with "Network security: Configure encryption types allowed for Kerberos" set to AES still receive RC4 service tickets for such an account, because the KDC picks the ticket’s encryption type from the target account’s attribute, or that default, not the client’s preference.
The Blast Radius
Any authenticated domain user can request a service ticket for the SPN with kerberos::ask or Rubeus kerberoast, and the KDC returns a ticket encrypted with a key derived from the service account’s NTLM hash whenever RC4 remains negotiable. That ticket is extracted, converted to hashcat mode 13100, and brute-forced offline with no logon attempts against the DC and no lockout trigger. Service accounts are disproportionately likely to hold static, non-expiring passwords set years earlier, often with elevated rights across file shares, SQL instances, or application tiers. A single cracked account converts silent reconnaissance by any domain user into a valid domain credential, and from there into lateral movement, Group Policy abuse, or a path to Domain Admin — all without a single failed authentication event in the Security log, although each request logs a 4769 event with encryption type 0x17 that can be monitored.
The Lead Mechanic Fix
Audit every SPN-bearing object with Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(servicePrincipalName=*)' -Properties msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes and flag any value of 0, null, or with bit 0x4 set. Remediate with Set-ADUser -Identity svc-app -KerberosEncryptionType AES128,AES256 (or the equivalent bitmask 0x18 via Set-ADObject -Identity <DN> -Replace @{'msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes'=24} for objects without the cmdlet parameter). Before enforcing AES only with the "Configure encryption types allowed for Kerberos" GPO, audit 4769 events for 0x17 tickets, check trusts, legacy apps and non-Windows clients, pilot on one OU, and keep the old settings for rollback. That GPO only writes msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes on the computer accounts that apply it; user accounts running services never process it, so set the attribute on them directly as above. Then rotate each account’s password to a random 32+ character value, one at a time, updating every service, task and app pool using it in the same window; this creates AES keys and voids any password cracked from captured tickets. Where feasible, migrate standalone service accounts to Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA), which remove static password exposure; set their encryption types to AES as well.
Related reading
Apply the safer control
Before you change production
Confirm the affected scope, export the current configuration, and test the replacement control in a non-production environment first.
Fix commands and configuration
Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(servicePrincipalName=*)' -Properties msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypesSet-ADUser -Identity svc-app -KerberosEncryptionType AES128,AES256Set-ADObject -Identity <DN> -Replace @{'msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes'=24}Verify, roll back or escalate
Verify
Re-run the detection test and a controlled negative-path test. Confirm the unsafe behaviour is blocked while approved traffic still succeeds.
Rollback
Restore the exported configuration if the new control blocks required production traffic, then narrow the policy before redeployment.
Escalate
Escalate when the blast radius is uncertain, the control cannot be tested safely, or remediation requires an outage or security exception.
Fixed? Get the next one before it hits you: The KBY Brief
Practical fixes for the systems you run, by email about twice a week. Unsubscribe at any time.
About this page
Credited to
Dates
Published
Last updated
Corrections
No corrections are listed for this page. Some review sweeps corrected pages without naming each one; those are in the corrections log.
Was this useful?
Reports go to the site owner and are used to correct pages. Corrections are listed at /corrections.