JPMorgan Chase, Visa and Mastercard Say Third-Party Vendors Were Hacked, and the Vendors Are Not Named
Three financial giants blame outside vendors for a data theft claimed by the n0n extortion group. What they have said, what researchers found in the leaked files, and the cloud trust checks every IT team can make now.

JPMorgan Chase, Visa and Mastercard have each said that an outside service provider was hacked and that customer information may be involved. An extortion group called n0n claimed all three, according to The Register, and none of the firms has named the vendor, said when it happened, or said how many people are affected. What they have said is narrow. What we can add is the one part that is useful to an IT team whatever the vendor turns out to be: how outside suppliers get into cloud accounts, and the checks that tell you whether yours could be used the same way.
#What the three firms have said
Chase posted on X on 19 November: “We have learned that third parties who provide services to the firm were the target of a cyber attack.” It said that, on its investigation so far, “the attackers accessed certain marketing data held by those vendors, which may include some customer names and email addresses”, that there is no disruption to its services, and that it will contact affected customers where appropriate and offer support including credit monitoring. It also said there is no connection to the service disruption some customers experienced earlier in the week.
Visa told The Register that the claims “are associated with an incident involving a third-party service provider in Asia Pacific”, that its systems were not involved, and that no payments data such as card numbers were affected. A Mastercard spokesperson told the same outlet that an incident at a third-party provider “resulted in the exposure of a limited amount of email addresses – non-payments information – from a small subset of cardholders enrolled in a specific benefit program”, and that the exposure has been contained.
The Register reports that n0n listed all three on its data-leak site on Monday 16 November. It describes the group as believed to be Russia-based, and says it emerged in September. We have not seen or linked to any of the stolen data, and we would not.
#What the leaked files appear to contain
The Register followed up on 20 November with an analysis by SOCRadar, a threat-intelligence firm that has tracked n0n since it appeared. SOCRadar’s chief information security officer told the outlet that the firm parsed all 14 files in the Visa and Mastercard samples and “found no card numbers, expiry dates, CVVs, passwords, dates of birth, or home addresses in any file”. The files did contain mobile numbers, Bank Identification Number prefixes, and dated airline, hotel and restaurant bookings. In his words, that is “what a fraudster needs to pose as a concierge desk or a bank” in an email or voice-phishing attack.
SOCRadar says the published files are only about 0.4 percent of the roughly 4.3 GB and 1.9 million marketing events n0n claims to hold, so a further release is possible. It also says both sets appear to come from the same upstream provider, with the same column layout and record format. SOCRadar has not analysed the Chase data. The Next Web, citing Cybernews, reports that the Chase file holds about 16,000 customer email addresses, account IDs and in some cases phone numbers, and says it has not verified the data itself.
#The vendor that has been linked, and what that is and is not
Here we have to be careful about what is established. Wiz, a cloud security company, published a report earlier this month, working with Sentra and Mandiant, about a campaign against customers of Qubole, a data-processing platform. According to Wiz, between 14 and 26 October an attacker used credentials from an AWS account associated with Qubole to assume IAM roles that customers had created to trust Qubole’s account. Wiz says that, once inside, the attacker listed resources, collected configuration and secrets, read S3 data, and in some cases downloaded whole buckets. Wiz added on 11 November that a Risky Business newsletter reported n0n had claimed responsibility for that intrusion.
SOCRadar’s chief information security officer told The Register that the timing of the bank-vendor breach “fits the Qubole supply-chain campaign”, and described that as his company’s assessment, “not a confirmed finding”. The Register says Qubole’s parent company, Idera, did not respond to its questions, and that the three financial firms declined to say which provider was compromised or whether Qubole was the access path. So there is no confirmation from any of the companies named. We are not saying Qubole was the route into the banks’ vendors. We are saying a security firm has suggested it, that the vendor with the documented method is a different matter from the unnamed vendors, and that the method is worth knowing about on its own merits.
#How the access worked, according to Wiz
Many SaaS products that work inside a customer’s AWS account use a cross-account IAM role. During onboarding the customer creates a role whose trust policy lets the vendor’s AWS account assume it, usually with an External ID as a condition. Wiz says every request it attributed to the attacker included an External ID and every one succeeded. Two details matter for defenders. First, in most of the environments Wiz saw, the attacker’s requests were the only role assumptions from the vendor account that month, so the trust policies were still in place for integrations that were not being used. Second, Wiz points out that an External ID is logged in plaintext in CloudTrail and is often stored by the vendor and in infrastructure-as-code, so it should not be the only control.
Wiz also says the attacker tried the credentials it found, including keys from the victims’ own accounts, Entra ID client secrets and Okta client credentials, using the open-source TruffleHog tool. Those belonged to the affected organisations, not to the vendor.
#Six checks for your own accounts
- List every role that trusts an outside account. Any IAM role whose trust policy names an account that is not yours is a standing way in. Wiz recommends this inventory first.
- Delete the ones you no longer use. Wiz’s observation that unused roles still accepted the attacker’s requests is the sharpest lesson here. A trust policy for a trial you finished in 2024 is still a door.
- Narrow who can use the role. Where the vendor supports it, Wiz suggests naming the specific principal rather than the whole account, and adding an
aws:SourceIporaws:SourceVpcecondition limited to the vendor’s published network ranges. Wiz says a source IP condition alone would have blocked every role assumption it saw. Our own write-up of the missing External ID problem covers the related confused-deputy case. - Cut what the role can reach. Wiz says access to Lambda configuration, Secrets Manager, Systems Manager parameters and broad S3 read is often granted for convenience. Remove what the integration does not need.
- Turn on the logs that would show S3 reads. CloudTrail management events record the role assumption and the bucket listing but not the object reads. Wiz says missing logs left responders blind in several victims. Our note on CloudTrail trails that silently exclude data events explains the gap.
- If you used Qubole, hunt back to 1 October. Wiz lists what to look for: AssumeRole events from its Qubole-associated account (805246085872) where the source address is not an AWS address, and the IAM user IDs it names. If a role was assumed, rotate every secret and Lambda variable it could read and revoke active sessions, because rotating a credential does not end a session already issued.
#Our view
We think the banks’ statements are accurate and tell you almost nothing. “Marketing data held by vendors” is a description of where the data sat, not of how it was reached, and all three firms declined to say which supplier was involved. That is their right, and it also means customers cannot yet judge their own exposure. Our reading is that the useful signal is the pattern. In the Expedia case we covered last week, the cause was also a third party. Supplier access is now the common thread in the breaches we are seeing, and the controls in that list are old, cheap and unglamorous.
The decision for an IT team is whether to chase the Qubole link or to do the inventory regardless. We would do the inventory regardless. If you have never used the platform, nothing in the Wiz hunt applies to you, but the trust-policy check applies to every vendor with a role in your accounts. We expect more organisations to be named in the coming days, because SOCRadar says a further release is possible. We would be wrong about the pattern if a vendor is named and it turns out to have been compromised by something unrelated to cloud trust.
One question to put to every supplier that touches your cloud or your customer data, word for word: “Which of our accounts can your platform reach today, from which network ranges, and how would we know if someone else used that access?”
Our Expedia report covers the earlier case.
#If you run a small business without an IT team
None of this means your card has been used or your bank account is at risk: Visa says card numbers were not affected, Mastercard describes the exposure as non-payments information, and SOCRadar found no card numbers in the files it checked. The realistic risk is a convincing message. If you hold a card from one of these firms, expect callers or emails that know your travel and phone number, and do not give anything out to someone who rang you. If a provider manages your cloud, ask them the question above.
#What we do not know
We do not know which vendors were breached, when, or how many people are affected. We do not know whether the Qubole campaign is connected. We have not verified the leaked data and have not looked at it. Chase’s own wording is “may include”, and it says it will contact affected customers where appropriate. We will update this story if a vendor is named or the firms say more.
Evidence trail
Sources and verification
Primary documentation and external technical references used in this article.
- 01The Register: Chase, Visa, Mastercard confirm third-party cyberattacks that may have exposed customers' info (19 November 2026)theregister.com
- 02The Register: Visa, Mastercard theft included info useful for phishing, but not draining bank accounts, say researchers (20 November 2026)theregister.com
- 03The Next Web: JPMorgan Chase, Visa and Mastercard vendor breach and the n0n leakthenextweb.com
- 04Wiz: Trusted by Default, Qubole Cross-Account Access Abused in the Wildwiz.io
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